Blaise Pascal - Faith and Reason

by William J Tsamis

"There is sufficient light for those who desire to see, and there is sufficient darkness for those of a contrary disposition."
Pensees 149
_____________________________

At the dawn of the seventeenth century, the Western world was experiencing one of the most profound paradigm shifts in scientific and philosophic intellectual history. With the overthrow of the ancient Ptolemaic geocentric cosmology, Copernicus and Galileo had prevailed in the arena of astronomy by demonstrating the theory of heliocentrism, Francis Bacon had laid the groundwork for a new scientific epistemology (i.e., the scientific method), and Rene Descartes, impressed by strict mathematical deductive logic, rejected the a priori assumptions of the medieval Scholastic philosophers and instead set forth a new methodological process of arriving at philosophic truth. Essentially, Descartes' method emphasized a subjective approach, beginning with his classic dictum, "Cogito, ergo sum" ("I think, therefore I am"), thus rejecting the presuppositional acceptance of certain objective theistic assertions. So clearly, although theism had not yet been denied, this new shift in epistemological methodology would clearly predict the ascent of reason, which, of course, would culminate during the era of the Enlightenment, or Age of Reason, in the eighteenth century. Thus, it was at the threshold of this new era, marked by the Copernican revolution and Cartesian epistemology that the spirit of skepticism and freethinking would be born -- the sword had been unsheathed, and a fire had been kindled which would eventually explode into a war of worldviews, a war that we even witness today, i.e., the war between theism (revelation and reason) and philosophical naturalism (reason alone).

Blaise Pascal was born in Clermont, France in 1623, Clermont being the city from where Pope Urban II launched the First Crusade in 1095. In addition to the intellectual changes which were occuring in Pascal's world, Europe was experiencing profound religious transformation as well as political chaos. This was the era of the post-Reformation when the religious unity of medieval Christendom had been shattered, and the violence of the Thirty Years War (1618-48) would leave the old Holy Roman Empire in utter desolation, with many cities and villages, once prosperous in agriculture and industry, now razed to the ground, their memory smouldering in the ashes of their remains. So whereas the intellectual spirit of man was thriving and going through marked evolutive change, the essential nature of man still appeared unchanged, arrested by its innate tendency toward divisiveness and destruction, imprisoned in the dungeon of its own depravity.

Now although the societal context in which Pascal lived was one of heightened volatility, the young Blaise was reared in a very stable, upper-class environment, his father Etienne being a principal financial magistrate who once contended with the infamous Cardinal Richelieu, the chief prime minister of Louis XIII. Tragically, however, the young Pascal's mother died when he was only three, and his years of infancy would be plagued by illness, something that would haunt him throughout his entire life. Nevertheless, Etienne Pascal was a capable father who, with the help of his daughters, Gilberte and Jacqueline, would sustain the young Blaise and then impel him into a career of intellectual magnificence. Essentially, Etienne Pascal was an ingenious man who was not only an able financial magistrate, but he was well versed in mathematics, ancient languages, Greek literature, and the art of poetry. Yet as a freethinker, he was critical of contemporary pedagogical methods, so he decided to take the matter of his son's education into his own hands, and true to his committment, Etienne did not fail.

Beginning at a very early age, the young Pascal began to display extraordinary signs of intellectual prowess. Whether or not the story is true, that the twelve-year-old Blaise discovered complex geometrical principles on his own, it is certain that the young Pascal was a child prodigy and savant who excelled in the disciplines of mathematics and physics. At age sixteen he wrote a treatise on conic sections - i.e., circles, ellipses, and parabolas which are formed when a cone is intersected by a plane - his essay would be published in the following year. Shortly thereafter, Pascal would invent a digital calculating machine which would aid his father in the assessment of taxes, and in subsequent years, his experiments on atmospheric pressure and the possibility of a vacuum (something that Descartes claimed could not exist) would astonish the scientific intelligentsia. In addition to these achievements, Pascal would continue to make important contributions in the fields of mathematics and physics, especially with regard to probability theory and hydrodynamics (a branch of physics that deals with the forces produced by water and other fluids). Needless to say, Pascal would be universally acclaimed for his innumerable and timeless contributions to the disciplines of mathematics and science.

In the year 1646, however, Pascal would begin a spiritual journey that would possess his mind and occupy his soul until his tragic death at the young age of thirty-nine in 1662. And during this period in his life, "Pascal the mathematician and physicist" would become "Pascal the apologist and philosopher." Though he never abandoned his scientific experiments, he nevertheless consecrated his work to the glory of God and began to focus his penetrating mind on philosophical and theological pursuits.

It was in January of 1646 when his father had severely injured his leg that two profoundly religious men came to care for the ailing Etienne - thus, Blaise would be deeply impressed by the degree of Christian charity and spirituality that these two men evoked. Since these men were Jansenists, a movement within Roman Catholicism that was based on the teachings of Cornelius Jansenius (1585-1638), bishop of Ypres and author of the controversial work Augustinus, it seemed natural for Pascal to be drawn initially toward the Jansenist school of thought. Essentially, Jansenism resurrected the ancient Pelagian Controversy, a theological debate in the ancient church (ca. 400) between Augustine and Pelagius over the issues of grace, free will, and original sin. In contrast to the Jesuit teaching that grace is effective when the recipient assents and cooperates with God through free will, Jansenius taught that grace is wholly unmerited and therefore granted to the recipient by God through predestination. Thus, the ideas proposed by Jansenius were in the tradition of Augustinian thought, and not unlike those of John Calvin. Nevertheless, his central propositions were declared heretical by Pope Innocent X in 1653, but the firestorm of controversy would continue to rage on for some time. And in the midst of this theological conflict, Blaise Pascal would enter the arena as a philosophical thinker and polemicist par excellence.

On Monday, November 23, 1654, the Feast of St. Clement, Pascal experienced a profound spiritual awakening and conversion that he described in terms of mystical illumination. Prior to that fateful nght of the 23rd, Pascal had taken the Roman Catholic ritual quite seriously, especially since he experienced the profound religiosity of the two Jansenist brethren who cared for his father in 1646; nevertheless, Pascal was plagued by spiritual distress and despair - he still felt as if he hadn't yet experienced true communion with God. So at the height of his struggle, while he was yearning and hungering for a deep interpersonal relationship with the God who seemed to evade him, or the "hidden God" as he later referred to the Supreme Being,1 Pascal's spirit was filled with immense grace and glory, as the "hidden God" determined to reveal Himself to the earnest seeker through a profound spiritual experience. Later, Pascal would relate his mystical experience with the following words:

"From about half past ten in the evening until about half past twelve, FIRE - God of
Abraham, God of Isaac, God of Jacob, not of the philosophers and scholars. Certitude, certitude. Heartfelt joy, peace. God of Jesus Christ. My God and thy God. Thy God shall be my God" (this text is from what is called the Memorial, a piece of parchment which was sewn into the lining of Pascal's coat).

It was at this point, then, that Pascal dedicated himself entirely to God and sought to serve the Divine Master with austerity and rigor. With the same degree of penetrating ingenuity that he had applied to his mathematic and scientific pursuits, Pascal now immersed himself in the study of Scripture and the Church Fathers, and it was not uncommon for him to turn to Protestant and rabbinical sources as well.

During the years 1655-57, Pascal, who sympathized with the Jansenist cause, articulated a powerful defense of certain Jansenist ideas and articulated a powerful polemic against the Jesuits in what has come to be known as the Lettres Provinciales. Writing anonymously in order to avoid imprisonment, Pascal essentially attacked the contemporary moral theology of the Jesuits. As the Jesuit scholar and historian of philosophy, Frederick Copleston indicates, "Pascal regarded the casuistry (the application of moral principles to particular cases) of the moral theologians as evidence of moral laxity and as an unjustifiable attempt to make Christianity easier for the more or less worldly-minded.">/em>2 In this regard, Pascal greatly respected and identified with the seriousness of Jansenist Christianity, although he never fully identified himself with any sect, so it would be an error to speak of Pascal as a committed Jansenist.3 Nevertheless, Pascal's polemical pen flagellated the Jesuits and caused them considerable aggravation.

As the great thinker was unwittingly entering into the final phase of his life (1657-62), he took it upon himself to prepare An Apology for the Christian Religion, a work which would be written with the intent of converting skeptics and freethinkers. With his years of intimate experience among the intelligentsia of his time, and with his penetrative ingenuity, Pascal was certainly proven for such a monumental work - however, fate would have it that the great Pascal would be cut down in his prime at the young age of thirty-nine, and the world would be left with about a thousand of his maxims, aphorisms, philosophical insights, and notes, later to be compiled into a work called Pensees (lit. "Thoughts"). Although the philosophical world would have been much richer with a systematic apologetic work by Pascal, scholars have nevertheless been able to glean from his writings his essential philosophical and theological position, a rather unique apologetic approach from which contemporary Christian thinkers can learn volumes,

So, now let us approach the question regarding Pascal's philosophical contribution. Why was his thought so unique, and why has his perspective transcended the centuries? Ironically, Pascal's philosophic insight differed greatly from the thinkers of his time. For instance, whereas Descartes, who was also a mathematician of great reupute, reasoned that mathematical principles could serve as the paradigm for inferring philosophic knowledge,4 Pascal regarded Descartes' exaltation of matehmatical sovereignty as overly ambitious and useless with regard to philosophical and theological applications. And here lies the wonder of Pascal. In contrast to his contemporaries who had elevated science and mathematics to an ascendant level, the philosophical genius of Pascal was that throughout his career as a mathematician and physicist, he had plunged the very dephs of reason to such a degree that only a handful of thinkers in the course of human civilization could be ranked with him And because he deeply penetrated the very depths of reason to a point which was beyond the common reach of man, he therefore recognized the limitations of reason. He had journeyed to its very perimeter, and he thus perceived that there was no traversing beond that point. Before him stood an insurpassable chasm, and though he realized that the truth regarding ultimate reality awaited on the other side, he knew that not he, nor anyone else, could pass over the insurpassable chasm. Thus, he dismissed the omnicompetence of reason and instead recognized the finitude of man's potential intellect. In one of his famous quotes from his Pensees, he humbly concedes the finitude of his own reason - and ironically it is reason herself, which he has met face to face, who instructs him as to his limitations. In one of his honest encounters with uncertainty, he wrote:

"I do not know who put me into the world, nor what the world is, nor what I am myself. I am terribly ignorant about everything. I don't know what my body is, or my senses, or my soul, or even that part of me which thinks what I am saying, which reflects about everything and about itself, and does not know itself any better than it
knows anything else. I see the terrifying spaces of the universe hemming me in, and I
find myself attached to one corner of this vast expanse without knowing why I have been put in this place rather than that . . . All I know know is that I must soon die, but what I know least about is this very death which I cannot evade. Just as I do not know whence I come, so I do not know whither I am going. All I can know is that when I leave this world I shall fall forever into nothingness or into the hands of a wrathful God, but I do not know which of these two states is to be my eternal lot." (emphasis mine) Pensees 427

This spirit of uncertainty regarding the omnicompetence of reason, contrary to modern postivisitc and naturalistic notions, is actually indicative of the humility of other great thinkers such as Socrates,5 who has served as the paradigmatic thinker for intellectual modesty and careful epistemology ever since the Greek classical era (ca. 400 BC). Thus, echoing Socrates, Pascal recognized his own limitations (despite his magnificent academic achievements which were based on reason alone), and in so doing, he anticipated the thought of Soren Kierkegaard (1813-55). Kierkegaard, too, was reluctant to build an ambitious rationalistic system, and like Pascal, he perfectly undersood the apparent ambiguity of God, and the importance of faith in the Christian life: "I contemplate the order of nature in finding God, and I see omnipotence and wisdom; but I also see much else that disturbs my mind and excites anxiety. The sum of all this is an objective uncertainty" (emphasis mine).6 Nevertheless, despite these realizations of the ambiguity of God, both Pascal and Kierkegaard, rather than seeing uncertainty as a weak link in an apologetic system, perceived such ambiguities as "that which must be," especially if we stand by the assertion that God is wholly transcedent and unfathomable (Rom 11:33 // Isa 55:8-9), apart from his own determined self-revelation.

Notwithstanding our discussion of Pascal's concept of God's ambiguity, the great thinker did in fact integrate an undeniable existential principle into his system which was, at the same time, both similar and dissimilar to the assertion of Descartes. Simply whereas Descartes argued that self-existence ("Cogito, ergo sum") was the key pillar upon which man must erect all subsequent knowledge, Pascal argued that it was in fact "the end of self-existence" (i.e., death) with which man must concern himself primarily and ultimately. For Pascal, knowledge and acclaim in life were futule if man disregarded this essential existential problem:

"Nothing is so important to man as his state: nothing more fearful than eternity. Thus the fact that there exist men who are indifferent to the loss of their being and peril of an eternity of wretchedness is against nature. With everything else they are quite different; they fear the most trifling things, foresee and feel them; and the same man who spends so many days and nights in fury and despair at losing some office or at some imaginary affront to his honor is the very one who knows that he is going to lose everything through death but feels neither anxiety nor emotion. It is a monstrous thing to see one and the same heart at once so sensitive to minor things and so strangely insensitive to the greatest. An inevitable death, which threatens us at every moment, must infallibly in a few years face us with the inescapable and appalling alternative of being annihilated or wretched for all eternity." Pensees 427, 432

For Pascal, then, the shadow of death loomed large, and the idea of facing eternity without knowing one's destiny was simply a burden to wearisome to bear -- the stakes were simply too high. Thus, Pascal articulated his famous Wager-argument, which essentially set forth the idea that the Christian has nothing to lose (even if he is mistaken), while the atheist has everything to lose (if he is mistaken). The most reasonable position, then, would be for one to place his wager on the existence of God, since there is nothing to lose one way or the other. And the sensual pleasures he might sacrifice in his devotion to God, would simply be reciprocated by the peace of mind, joy, and harmonious living which would be the product of his devotional life.

Interestingly, Pascal did not offer his Wager-argument as a conventional proof of the existence of God, but rather as a challenge to those skeptics and atheists who were unconvinced by the traditional arguments and thus remained comfortably in a state of "suspended judgment."7 As for Pascal, he placed his wager on the existence of God, and he found his perfect hope in the person of Jesus Christ.

At one o'clock in the morning, on the 19th of August 1662, Blaise Pascal breathed his last, his final words being, "May God never abandon me." Throughout his life he had struggled with chronic ill-health, yet as he approached the bitter end, his condition worsened to the point that he suffered terribly and tragically. There was nothing heroic about the death of Pascal - no glory or martyrdom by which he would be remembered. Nothing but a slow, progressively, gruesome disease which would consume his life at a time when the great thinker, in the eyes of man, should have been soaring through the heavens with the intellectual gifts that God had granted him. Yet perhaps this is part of the enigma of Pascal - the profound mystery. For, why would God bestow upon a young child such gifts of extraordinary magnitude, and then at the prime age of thirty nine - precisely at a point when the young man would be writing a powerful systematic defense of the Christian faith - why would God snatch away his very soul? Why? Well, perhaps if Pascal coud speak to us today, he would simply say that it was all part of the ambiguity of God . . . part of the uncertainty which God has purposed in His creation in order that men might come to Him through "faith," rather than simply through intellectual assent, for as the writer of the epistle to the Hebrews teaches us, "without faith it is impossible to please Him" (Heb 11:6). Thus, it was in the realm of such faith that the great Pascal attained his communion with God . . . Transcending the idea of reason alone, the great philosopher recognized that God had purposed a degree of ambiguity in His creation in order that He might discover the faithfulness of the heart, rather than the certitude of the mind.

"Acknowledge the truth of religion in its very obscurity . . . for it is not true that everything reveals God, and it is not true that everything conceals God. But it is true at once that he hides from those who tempt Him and that He reveals Himself to those who seek Him." Pensees 439, 444

________________________________________________________________________

Works Cited

1. John A. Mackay's "Forward" in Emille Cailliet, The Clue to Pascal (Philadelphia: Westminster Press), 1943, p. 10.

2. Frederick Copleston, S.J., A History of Philosophy - Vol. 4, Modern Philosophy from Descartes to Leibniz (New York: Doubleday), 1963, p. 156.

3. Ibid., p. 155.

4. Antony Flew, "Rene Descartes" in A Dictionary of Philosophy (New York: St Martin's Press), 1979.

5. Plato, Plato's Apology, trans. by Benjamin Jowett (New York: Simon and Schuster), 1928.

6. Soren Kierkegaard, "Concluding Unscientific Postscript," quoted by Copleston in
A History of Philosophy - Vol 7, p. 346

7. Copleston, A History of Philosophy - Vol. 4, p. 169.

Paul's Condemnation of Humanity

by William J Tsamis

William J Tsamis, M. A.
_______________________

The ancient proverb, "There are more gods in Athens than there are men," 1 must have been in the mind of the Apostle Paul as he walked through the streets of the city of Aristotle and Plato in the year A.D. 50. The once great seat of the powerful Athenian city state, though sacked by the Romans in the second century B.C., nevertheless maintained its reputation as a major center of learning and its primacy among the cities of idols in the ancient world. What Paul saw in Athens could only be followed by Corinth, Ephesus, and Rome. Indeed, at the Parthenon the goddess Athena stood tall with brilliant bronze spear in hand. Zeus, Poseidon, Apollo, indeed all of the gods of the Olympian pantheon had their cults in Athens. To the ancient citizen, Athens was a city of great adorn and beauty, bathed in divine glory. And though Paul was certainly not blind to the artistic beauty which Athens beheld - to this holy apostle, such images and architectural wonders were nothing more than representations of the hideous and the demonic, indeed the realm of the heathen. Such vile depravity and condition of wickedness was enough to cause in the former Pharisee a sense of revulsion which had been unknown in Jerusalem for centuries, since the years of the captivity centuries prior.

Perhaps Paul was moved by the Athenian blindness of this gross paganism, or perhaps the thought of the "wrath of God" was in the back of his mind - at any rate, Luke tells us that "[Paul's] spirit was provoked within him as he observed the idols in the city" (Acts 17:16). Thus, Paul delivered his monotheistic elocution to the Epicureans, the Stoics and other Aereopagites, all to little avail however (though never a greater man stood where the Jew from Tarsus stood). So, through the midst of malcontents and religious partisans, Paul made his way out of Athens, westward to the notorius city of Corinth (c. A.D. 51-52), where he would proclaim the gospel in another pagan colony - this time against the landscape of the temples of Aphrodite, Apollo, Asclepius, Hera, and other glorified gods of the Greek pantheon.

It would be several years later that the Apostle Paul would write his Epistle to the Romans (c. A.D. 56-57) from the very city of Corinth, where he would level his condemnation upon pagan mankind. As we go through some of these texts, we will actually "feel" the "dark shadows" of Athens and Corinth making their way into the lyrical discourse as Paul imparts to the church at Rome this theology of condemnation and wrath of God. It is precisely in these verses where the holy apostle begins to set forth God's indictment against man, and argue subsequently that "[since all men stand condemned before God]," and "[since no man can be justified (declared righteous) according to his deeds]," [man must therefore turn to God and look to him for "justification" instead] (3:23-24, 28). Thus, in this paper we will present a consise discussion of Paul's condemnation of pagan mankind as expressed in Rom 1:18-25.2

These few verses are reminiscent of the genre of the prophets, i.e. those who condemned the pagan practices of the ancients. And although Paul is setting the stage to demonstrate why all mankind is depraved before God, and therefore why all men need justification through Jesus Christ, in this short paper we will limit ourselves to a discussion of the sin of "idolatry," which in the words of Paul, is a heinous and monstrous crime in the eyes of God. With this said, then, let us begin.

18 For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness
and unrighteousness of men who suppress the truth in unrighteousness,

19 because that which is known about God is evident within them; for God
made it evident to them

20 For since the creation of the world His invisible attributes, His eternal
power and divine nature, have been clearly seen, being understood
through what has been made, so that they are without excuse.

21 For even though they knew God, they did not honor Him as God or
give thanks, but they became futile in their speculations, and their
foolish heart was darkened.

22 Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools,

23 and exchanged the glory of the incorruptible God for an image in the
form of corrupible man and of birds and four-footed animals and crawling creatures.

24 Therefore God gave them over in the lusts of their hearts to impurity, so that their bodies would be dishonored among them.

25 For they exchanged the truth of God for a lie, and worshiped and served
the creature rather than the Creator, who is blessed forever. Amen.


Though we have presented the entire text above, we have done so for the sake of context. As stated, our discussion will be concerned with a few selected texts. Thus, let us begin with v. 18 and the concept of the wrath of God. However, let us first point out that the phrase "the wrath of God is revealed from heaven" does not stand in isolation, but rather is paralleled in v. 17, "the righteousness of God is revealed from heaven," with another close parallel in 3:21, ". . . the righteousness of God has been manifested." Although v. 17 has been discussed for centuries, and I believe that I have a good Protestant evangelical understanding of that text, for the sake of space and this assignment I would like to begin with v. 18 and Paul's discussion of the "wrath of God."

It is interesting, that although the concept of the "wrath of God" has only been particularly unpalatable to the Western mindset since the Enlightenment, in truth, we find our very first objection to this phrase in the work of the great heresiarch, Marcion of Pontus (c. A.D. 85-160). Indeed, in "his" Apostolicon (Marcionite canon), wherein he included an "edited" version of Paul's Epistle to the Romans, in v. 18 he omitted from the phrase "wrath of God," the part that says "of God" because, of course, his excised phrase conformed to his anti-Yahwistic Gnostic theology. Indeed, in the Marcionite text of Romans the phrase is "For the wrath is being revealed from the heaven . . ."3

Whether or not one finds the concept of the "wrath of God" distasteful really matters not. If the orthodox/canonical Christian metanarrative is true, which we believe it is on the basis of revelation and sufficient reason, the "wrath of God" is simply one aspect of God's person that has to do with his holiness and justice. Alluding to Anders Nygren, Douglas Moo, in his commentary on the Book of Romans, puts it nicely when he writes, "[God] cannot behold with indifference that His creation is destroyed and His holy will is trodden underfoot. Therefore He meets sin with His mighty and annihilating reaction."4 Thus, Paul is using the phrase "wrath of God" consistently with the prophetic genre; however, for Paul, this "wrath" not only has futuristic implications, but also those which are very much present. Thus, to those who stand outside of Christ, this "wrath" is already being poured out.5 According to a number of scholars whose works I consulted regarding this text, the desolation of societies and the deterioration of any moral fabric within these cultures is a juridicial consequence of their apostasy from, or ignorance of Christ, who is the sole "mediator" of any "right relationship" (v. 17) with God. In matter of fact, it is only through Christ that "justification" can be conferred upon people(s) (3:20-26), thus making possible any "right relationship" with God. Apart from Christ in God, there can only be death, dissolution and demise as a people wither and die because they are "separated" (or "cut-off") from God who is the source of all life.

Now we ask, "Who are those who 'suppress the truth in unrighteousness'" according to the holy apostle?" Though Fitzmyer correctly indicates that Paul "has in mind the totality of pagan society,"6 and this is consistent with the context, there is no argument against the notion that there is a categorical element here at work as well.

Since the dawn of time, man has been in rebellion against God, developing elaborate systems of polytheism, pantheism, and a host of other metanarratives. Indeed, the creative potential of man can be seen not only in the outward manifestations of such idolatrous and false religions, but in the inner teachings of such religions and philosophies as well. Even to this day, I am astonished at how "inventive" man can be when it comes to constructing elaborate philosophical/religious thought systems which are antithetical to Christianity. On almost every point, there is an antithesis to Christian doctrine which at some point becomes quite obvious to the Christian student of religion and philosophy, that all religions and most philosophies inherently and "systematically" proffer an alternative thesis or a direct counterpoint as if the "overthrow" of Christianity is the obvious goal. We have seen this in the past two millennia, especially after the Enlightenment, so we cannot say that Paul was talking about something future. Nevertheless, the categorical implication (which includes all heretical ideas) is there. It is obvious that some systems (e.g. macroevolution) purposely "suppress" the truth, while others (e.g. neo-Platonism) are speculative superstructures wherein pure fideism is necessary.

Leon Morris, however, believes that the English word "suppress" is too strong for the context; thus, he would prefer "hinder,"7 and perhaps I would agree with his assessment in the context. As he says, "[suppress] implies that sinners are successful."8 But in the Pauline context they are not successful in an absolute sense; they are only successful in that they attempted to "hinder" the truth.

The key to this whole idea of "suppressing" the truth is noted by Fitzmyer as he understands the Pauline intent which is quite evident:

For Paul the condition of pagan humanity results, first, from its
failure to recognize God for what he is, to glorify him, and to
thank him, when it could readily have done so, had it paid
due attention to the traces of him and his qualities evident
in the created world.9

Thus, "natural revelation," which is sufficient to bring one to faith in a Creator who possesses certain attributes, is rejected on account of depraved man's desire to set up himself above God (or make himself prior to God) in order that he might be able to do that which is in accord with his own will. Thus, he might create a cosmogony (e.g. the "Enuma Elish") wherein a story of the gods is told. And in order to mediate ultimate reality (i.e. the gods of the cosmogony) to the masses, a priestly class is created. Since the priests are the mediators of ultimate reality, they are the most powerful caste/class in the tribe; thus, they make certain demands upon the populace (who nominally believe in the things they have been taught), while at the same time allowing for a degree of hedonism to bring pleasure to the populace, and a sort of "symbiotic" relationship is created between the priests, the rulers, and the populace. In the midst of it all, visuals become necessary, so sacerdotalism becomes central to the pagan religion, with the construction of temples and the invention of elaborate priestly rites, all dedicated to propitiate a particular god, whose appetites are really a reflection of the appetites of man. This elaborate system is what Fitzmyer calls "the big lie,"10 in which they have no excuse.

This is what Paul considers particularly odious and detestable in the eyes of YHWH - that pagan mankind "exchanged the glory of the incorruptible God for an image in the form of corrupible man and of birds and four-footed animals and crawling creatures . . . they exchanged the truth of God for a lie, and worshiped and served the creature rather than the Creator" (1:23, 25). Now, in returning to our introduction, it isn't hard to imagine, from all that Paul had seen on his journeys through the pagan world, and from the Jewish teachings about how ancient Israel repeatedly became ensnared in the idolatries of the "nations" - it isn't hard to imagine the multitude of gods which paraded across Paul's mind. The "images of corruptible man" polluted the thought of the Greeks in the sense that nearly all of their gods were represented in some human form. In Corinth, from which Paul wrote his Epistle to the Romans, the goddess Aphrodite was honored in three temples. She was the Greek "fertility goddess," and "goddess of love," draped in soft flowing gowns and adorned with jewels. Her hair gleamed in the sunlight and her silvery feet completed the depiction of a charming and seductive woman.11 Additionally in Corinth there were human representations of Hera, Apollo and Asclepios, and the gods of Olympus - all "corruptible men and women." Further, Paul only had to recall stories from Exodus to think of such gods as Horus (which was portrayed as a falcon) or the sacred bull/cow gods, Apis and Hathor. Simply put, in this section on the "condemnation of pagan humanity," someone like the Apostle Paul not only encountered gross idolatry in his studies of Israel's past, but he journeyed through many cities of the Gentiles which, in his day, were polluted with dead "corruptible" gods, and in our day are filled with nothing but the ruined remains of that idolatrous past. Thus, what we see in historical ruin was "corruptible" all along, precisely as Paul said it was. And now, while archaeologists and others sift through the remains of dead gods and the remains of their temples, hundreds of millions of people worship the one, true living God, through Jesus Christ, in accord with the teachings of the Apostle Paul.


Endnotes
__________

1. Unknown ancient source.

2. A longer paper covering the entire section of Rom 1.18-32 would have been more interesting, including the discussion of the sins of the pagans; however, such a paper would have required me to overwrite for the assigned space.

3. Joseph A. Fizmyer, Romans, The Anchor Bible. (New York: Doubleday, 1998) 270.

4. Douglas J. Moo, The Epistle to the Romans. New International Commentary on the New Testament, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996), 100, n. 31.

5. Ibid., 101.

6. Fitzmyer, 270.

7. Leon Morris, The Epistle to the Romans, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1988), 77-78.

8. Ibid., 78.

9. Fitzmyer, 271.

10. Ibid.

11. Felix Guirand, "Greek Mythology" in New Larousse Encyclopedia of Mythology. Trans. Richard Aldington and Delano Ames. (New York: Crescent, 1989), 85-198.